Weaponized Interdependence and Dynamics of Partial Decoupling: Chokepoints, Adaptation, and the Security Dilemma in Advanced Technologies

Authors

  • Mofei Shen

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62327/rj3nfd17t4

Keywords:

China, U.S.-China Relations, Decoupling, Technology

Abstract

This paper examines the erosion of U.S.–China technological engagement through the lens of weaponized interdependence. It focuses specifically on advanced technology sectors, particularly semiconductors, as a representative case study. Through examining U.S. export restraints after the first Trump administration, this paper argues that current instability in U.S.– China relations arises less from complete ideological divergence or failure of outright containment policy than from a structured reaction–counterre- action dynamic triggered by chokepoint activation. When the United States employs export controls and allied coordination to manage perceived technological risks, China responds through defensive reconfiguration aimed at reducing asymmetric vulnerability, in addition to retaliation in rare-earth export controls. Over time, these interactions generate three structural transformations: supply-chain reconfiguration, substitution, and regulations reinforcing segmentation. While previous literature is based primar- ily on the short-term effectiveness of coercion, this paper shifts attention to technological restraints’ longer-term structural consequences. In summary, this paper suggests that technological interdependence is not dissolving but being selectively restructured. The result is a durable condition of partial, segmented decoupling in which interdependence persists under increasingly politicized rules of access.

References

“2024: How Does China Overcome the US’ Chip Sanctions?” The China Academy, January 30, 2024. https://thechinaacademy.org/2024-how-does-china- overcome-the-us-chip-sanctions/.

Adamson, Georgia, Saif Khan, and Tao Burga. “Should the US Sell Blackwell Chips to China? Assessing the Impacts of Exporting the B30A AI Chip.” October 25, 2025. https://ifp.org/wp-content/uploads/Should-the-US-Sell-Black- well-Chips-to-China.pdf.

Allen, Gregory C. “Understanding the Biden Administration’s Updated Export Controls.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 11, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-biden-administra- tions-updated-export-controls.

Baskaran, Gracelin. “China’s New Rare Earth and Magnet Restrictions Threaten U.S. Defense Supply Chains.” Center for Strategic and International Stud- ies, October 9, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-rare- earth-and-magnet-restrictions-threaten-us-defense-supply-chains.

Beckley, Michael. “The Peril of Peaking Powers: Economic Slowdowns and Impli- cations for China’s next Decade.” International Security 48, no. 1 (January 1, 2023): 7–46. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00463.

Brunnermeier, Markus, Rush Doshi, and Harold James. “Beijing’s Bismarckian Ghosts: How Great Powers Compete Economically.” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 161–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2018.1520571.

Campbell, Kurt M, and Ely Ratner. “The China Reckoning.” Foreign Affairs, Febru- ary 13, 2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/china-reckoning.

Cha, Victor D. “Collective Resilience: Deterring China’s Weaponization of Eco- nomic Interdependence.” International Security 48, no. 1 (2023): 91–124. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00465.

Chen, Ling, and Miles M Evers. “‘Wars without Gun Smoke’: Global Supply Chains, Power Transitions, and Economic Statecraft.” International Security 48, no. 2 (January 1, 2023): 164–204. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00473.

“China’s New Semiconductor Policies: Issues for Congress.” CRS Report R46767. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 20, 2021. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46767.

Ding, Jeffrey. “Japan’s Challenge in the Third Industrial Revolution.” In Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competi- tion. Princeton University Press, 2024.

Drezner, Daniel W. The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence. Wash- ington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021.

Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security 44, no. 1 (July 1, 2019): 42–79. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351.

Friedberg, Aaron. “The Growing Rivalry between America and China and the Fu- ture of Globalization.” Texas National Security Review, January 4, 2022. https://tnsr.org/2022/01/the-growing-rivalry-between-america-and- china-and-the-future-of-globalization/.

Fruits, Eric. “From Moore’s Law to Market Rivalry: The Economic Forces That Shape the Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry.” International Center for Law & Economics, November 17, 2025. https://laweconcenter.org/re- sources/from-moores-law-to-market-rivalry-the-economic-forces-that- shape-the-semiconductor-manufacturing-industry/.

Fuller, Douglas B. “Weaponizing Interdependence and Global Value Chains: U.S. Export Controls on Huawei.” Paper presented at the American Political Sci- ence Association (APSA) Annual Meeting, 2022.

G. van der Zwan. “Chinese Linkage and Democracy in Pakistan.” In Securitization and Democracy in Eurasia: Transformation and Development in the OSCE Region, edited by Anja Mihr, Paolo Sorbello, and Brigitte Weiffen. Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16659-4.

Gertz, Geoffrey. “Goodbye to Small Yard, High Fence.” New York Times, December 31, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/31/opinion/china-semicon- ductor-biden-xi.html

Glosserman, Brad. “De-Risking Is Not Enough: Tech Denial toward China Is Needed.” The Washington Quarterly 46, no. 4 (October 2, 2023): 103–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2023.2286134.

Goldstein, Avery. “US–China Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century: Déjà vu and Cold War II.” China International Strategy Review 2, no. 1 (June 2020): 48–62.

Hague, Danny. “Inside Beijing’s Chipmaking Offensive: Where Is China Gaining Ground?” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, July 14, 2025. https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/inside-beijings-chipmaking-offen- sive/.

Han, Liyu, and Jiaxun Sun. “Trade Strategies and Power Games between China, the US and India.” In The Future of Asian Trade Deals and IP. Bloomsbury Pub- lishing, 2019.

Kardon, Isaac B., and Wendy Leutert. “Pier Competitor: China’s Power Position in Global Ports.” International Security 46, no. 4 (2022): 9–47. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00433.

Kornbluh, Karen, and Julia Tréhu. “The New American Foreign Policy of Technol- ogy: Promoting Innovation, National Security, and Democratic Values in a Digital World.” German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2023. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48497.

Legro, Jeffrey W. “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 03 (August 16, 2007): 515. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592707071526.

Lim, Darren, and Victor Ferguson. “Conscious Decoupling: The Technology Secu- rity Dilemma.” In China Dreams, edited by Jane Golley, Ben Hillman, Linda Jaivin, and Sharon Strange, 57–65. ANU Press, 2020. http://doi.org/10.22459/CSY.2020.04.

Mearsheimer, John J. “The Inevitable Rivalry: America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics.” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2021. https://www.for- eignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-cold-war.

Miller, Chris. Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2022.

Minnich, John. “Trump, U.S.-China Competition, and the Future of Technology Transfer.” Global Public Policy and Governance, November 18, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43508-025-00125-9.

“‘Made in China 2025’ Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress.” CRS In Focus IF10964. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 12, 2024. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10964.

Naughton, Barry. “The Innovation-Driven Development Strategy, 2015–Present.” In The Rise of China’s Industrial Policy, 1978 to 2020. Lynne Rienner Publish- ers, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1515/9786078066605-005.

Pearson, Margaret M., Meg Rithmire, and Kellee S. Tsai. “China’s Party-State Cap- italism and International Backlash: From Interdependence to Insecurity.” International Security 47, no. 2 (2022): 135–76. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00447.

Risse, Marius, Fiama Angeles, and Anttoni Asikainen. “China’s Export Controls on Critical Raw Materials, Including Rare Earths.” Global Trade Alert, October 9, 2025. https://globaltradealert.org/blog/chinese-export-controls-on- critical-raw-materials-inventory.

“Scaling the Commanding Heights: The Logic of Technology Transfer Policy in Ris- ing China.” MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2023-2, June 29, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4496386.

Schleich, Matthew. “Securing Semiconductors: How to Scale-up Global Semicon- ductor Production and Protect U.S. National Security at the Same Time.” United States Department of State, May 16, 2023. https://2021- 2025.state.gov/securing-semiconductors-how-to-scale-up-global-semi- conductor-production-and-protect-u-s-national-security-at-the-same- time/.

Sutter, Karen M. “U.S. Export Controls and China: Advanced Semiconductors.” CRS Report R48642. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Sep- tember 19, 2025. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48642.

Swanson, Ana. “Trump’s Trade War with China Is Officially Underway.” The New York Times, July 5, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/busi- ness/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html.

Tan, Yeling, Mark Dallas, Henry Farrell, and Abraham Newman. “Driven to Self- Reliance: Technological Interdependence and the Chinese Innovation Ecosystem.” International Studies Quarterly 69, no. 2 (March 17, 2025).

https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaf017.

Triolo, Paul. “A New Era for the Chinese Semiconductor Industry: Beijing Responds

to Export Controls.” American Affairs, February 20, 2024. https://ameri- canaffairsjournal.org/2024/02/a-new-era-for-the-chinese-semiconduc- tor-industry-beijing-responds-to-export-controls/.

“U.S. And China Tighten Respective Export Restrictions on Advanced Technology and Critical Minerals.” Eversheds Sutherland, January 10, 2025. https://www.eversheds-sutherland.com/en/united-states/insights/us- and-china-tighten-respective-export-restrictions-on-advanced-technol- ogy-and-critical-minerals.

Whalen, Jeanne. “Three Months, 700 Steps: Why It Takes So Long to Produce a Computer Chip.” The Washington Post, July 7, 2021. https://www.washing- tonpost.com/technology/2021/07/07/making-semiconductors-is-hard.

Wu, Mark. “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance.” Harvard International Law Journal 57, no. 2 (January 1, 2016): 261–324.

Downloads

Published

2026-04-22

How to Cite

Shen, M. (2026). Weaponized Interdependence and Dynamics of Partial Decoupling: Chokepoints, Adaptation, and the Security Dilemma in Advanced Technologies. Hemispheres, 49(1). https://doi.org/10.62327/rj3nfd17t4